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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the ways in which ‘North Korea’ was securitized in a post-Cold War 
United States.  It argues that U.S. perceptions of North Korea were a continuation of Cold 
War discourse of danger by other representations.  North Korea was primarily understood as 
a security threat and such an understanding so dominated U.S. discourses as to close the 
possibility of alternative understandings.  After showing that the North was represented as a 
missile threat, a nuclear threat, or a ‘time bomb,’ this paper argues that a Cold War 
institutional framework made such an identity representation possible.  It concludes by 
analyzing the ways in which North Korea considered its own identity as an insecure state 
threatened by an ‘aggressive U.S.’ At the heart of the tension between the two countries 
stands the clash of identities, which resulted in a precarious “balance of terror” over the 
Korean peninsula. 
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1. Introduction 
 North Korea is a country every American loves to hate.  At the same time it is a 
country that most Americans acknowledge they do not know.  Herein lies the puzzle.  How is 
it that Americans have come to hate a country that they do not know? 
 
 We sometimes learn of a foreign country in a direct personal encounter, however 
limited that direct, personal experience may be.  But most of us at most of time get to know 
of a country via others’ accounts: a news story, a travelogue, a CNN coverage, a history book, 
an anthropological study, descriptions offered by officials, etc.  North Korea is no exception.  
Given that a vast majority of the Americans never visited North Korea, it is not an 
overstatement that Americans have learned of North Korea through accounts in the 
secondary sources they encounter.  Then, is it possible that they have come to hate the 
country they do not know because they have come to understand the North through a 
multitude of American representations that portrays it as an object of concern? 
 
 This paper ponders the question.  Building on the argument that American 
perceptions of North Korea were shaped within the Cold War framework, this paper argues 
that Americans love to hate the North because it has been made natural for them to see it as 
an object of hatred.  Whatever the causes of the hatred may have been, whether or not the 
North is to be blamed for it, it has become a norm for the Americans to see the country as 
deviant, problematic and dangerous.  Because North Korea is presented and understood only 
through a ‘securitization’ paradigm within which it is nothing but a security threat, and 
because such a paradigm enlarges the North’s “evil” behavior and erases its less malignant 
one, Americans find it natural to see the North for what it is: a danger.1 
 
 If during the Cold War it was less problematic to hold this view because the North 
was, after all, part of the Communist bloc, the main source of danger, it became more 
difficult to hold on to this perception after the Soviet bloc disintegrated.  No longer is it 
because the North is a Soviet or Chinese puppet that it is dangerous.  Rather it is because the 
country is no longer a Soviet or Chinese puppet.  To the post-Cold War, post-9/11 United 
States that identifies its security with the eradication of proliferation and terrorism, North 
Korea is dangerous in its own right.  For it is a proliferator and terrorist. 
 
 This paper argues that U.S. perceptions of North Korea need to be situated within the 
broader discursive framework in which the United States defined its and others’ identity in 
the post-Cold War world.2  Central to this discursive framework was “securitization” 
whereby North Korea was identified primarily as a security threat and the United States as a 
security provider.  The following analyzes the ways in which North Korea was discursively 
reconstituted as a threat to the post-Cold War United States.  First examined is the process by 
which the North was represented as a “missile threat,” followed by a discussion of the ways 
in which a “nuclear proliferation threat” became the dominant frame of understanding the 
North identity.  Seen within such frames, North Korea was an unproblematic danger.  The 
                                                 
1 Hazel Smith, “Bad, Mad, Sad or Rational Actor? Why the ‘Securitization’ Paradigm Makes for Poor Policy 
Analysis of North Korea,” International Affairs 76, no. 1: 111-132. 
2 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1992). 
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second section analyzes the ways in which the North understood itself and the United States.  
The aggressive North in U.S. eyes was regarded by the North Koreans as an insecure state 
that took various self-defensive measures against the threats by an aggressive U.S.  The 
action-reaction cycle, which has gone on between the North and the United States, resulted in 
a precarious “balance of terror” over the Korean peninsula and the current impasse over the 
“North Korean nuclear crisis.” 
 
2. North Korea According to the United States 
North Korea as a “Missile Threat” 
Naming an object is a crucial first step in governance, as Confucius noted thousands 
of years ago. A name places the object in a particular location in a social order of things, 
imputing a status and a meaning to it, a consequential act that enables social actors to 
understand how to deal with it. The consequential nature of naming can be seen in the 
“politics of naming” that was vividly played out immediately after Pyongyang launched a 
rocket at the end of August 1998.  U.S. intelligence immediately called it a “missile test;” 
this was then picked up and circulated as a “fact” by the media.  Government and military 
officials then cited media reports to explain what Pyongyang had done and what they were 
about to do in response.  These official statements lent more credence to the media reports of 
the “fact.”  Added to this were assessments by foreign policy experts and North Korean 
observers as to possible motives behind this “missile test.”  Some argued that it demonstrated 
yet once more Pyongyang’s dangerous aggressiveness while others suggested that it was 
designed to extract more concessions from the West.  Security specialists also joined in with 
their analyses of the security implications this “missile launch” might have: Japan was now 
under immediate danger of a direct attack from North Korea; even the United States was seen 
as within the range of the North’s missiles.  These specialists busily debated the best means 
to counter this new threat: whether to deploy Patriot batteries, to develop Theater Missile 
Defense, to employ preemptive measures, and so on. 
 
 Amidst all these reports, statements, analyses, and speculations, it had become 
accepted that the North had fired a missile.  Not only did all these significations coalesce to 
produce what Stuart Hall called the “reality effect” but the “reality” also triggered real 
responses, which in turn had the effect of entrenching the “Hobbesian culture”--to use 
Wendt’s apt phrase--between the North and its neighbors.3   The Japanese government 
immediately took punitive measures, such as cutting airline travel to North Korea and 
freezing KEDO funding. The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution 
condemning the North’s missile test fire.  The U.S. Senate passed a resolution tying U.S. 
funding for heavy oil to the president’s certification that Pyongyang did not export missiles.  
The U.S. House cut off KEDO funding. 
 
                                                 
3 Hall, Stuart, "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies," Culture, Society and 
the Media, ed. by Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (New York: Methuen, 
1982).  Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
                                                                                                                                   3 
Four days after it fired the “missile,” Pyongyang caught everybody off guard by 
announcing that it had launched a satellite. With unusual candor, it went so far as to provide 
a detailed description of the satellite’s orbit.  On September 14, U.S. State and Defense 
spokespersons publicly acknowledged that it had indeed launched a satellite, but failed to put 
the satellite in orbit.  By then, however, the symbolic struggle over this event was already 
over.  It had become reality that North Korea fired a missile over Japan.  And it had been 
taken for granted that the North’s missile test had undermined peace and stability in the 
region.  By then, the missile was even given a name, Taepodong, by Western experts even if 
it was being called Paektusan 1 ho by the North Koreans.4  The Japanese even coined a new 
hybrid term to describe the shock they felt when the “missile” flew over their heads: 
Taepodong shoku. 
  
In this example, the politics of signification was played out after North Korea fired a 
projectile into space in 1998, yet the same politics were repeated a year later even before an 
action took place.  Again, as before, U.S. intelligence picked up indications that the North 
was preparing to fire a “missile”; this was then dutifully reported by the media as a fact.  
Then policy makers and analysts acted on this fact, issuing statements, producing analyses, 
and implementing policy measures.  South Korean, Japanese and U.S. officials expended a 
considerable amount of political capital to persuade the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
chairman to issue a statement criticizing North Korea’s “missile” test-firing.  They also 
worked assiduously to convince the Chinese government to jump on the bandwagon.  These 
diplomatic maneuverings had immediate political implications, of course, but it is notable 
that a considerable amount of work had to be done to make certain everyone on the 
bandwagon saw the same reality.  At a deeper level, these statements and diplomatic gambits 
added another layer of reality to the “reality,” multiplying the “reality effect.” 
 
In order to grasp the full significance of the establishment of this “reality,” we need to 
juxtapose it with other possible, less threatening realities.  There is, of course, the North 
Korean official “reality” that the North Koreans had launched a satellite.  This reality was 
consistent with the available data about the projectile’s trajectory, and was conceded by the 
U.S. government.  To the extent that the North Koreans did have a scientific program to 
place a satellite in space, this reality was credible.  Since there is little technological 
distinction between a satellite launch and a missile test-fire, however, this reality may not 
have made much difference in terms of its security implications.  Whether or not the North 
had placed a satellite in space, it demonstrated to the world that it had the scientific know-
how, technical prowess and political will to produce a projectile that it could use for a 
military purpose.  What mattered the most to South Korea and the United States then was 
that they believed Pyongyang intended it to be a military device with which to undermine the 
peace and stability of the region.  This concern was well reflected in all the official 
statements and analyses that repeatedly and pointedly called the North’s “missile test” a 
threat to peace.  U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright put it quite bluntly: “We 
stressed that another long-range missile launch, whether it is declared to be a missile test or 
                                                 
4 U.S. intelligence has called a missile by the name of its first launch site.  Although Taepodong is reportedly an 
old name of what is now called Musudanri in Hamgyôngbukto, it is not clear why the old name, which 
incidentally sounds like “big cannon city,” was chosen. 
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an attempt to place a satellite in orbit, would be highly destabilizing and would have very 
serious consequences for our efforts to build better relations.”5 
 
Even if it had been a missile, there would have been various possible meanings.  But 
government officials produced a stream of significations to privilege one meaning over 
others.  South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and President Clinton warned in their summit 
in July 1999 that if North Korea test-fired another missile it would “pose a serious obstacle to 
peace” on the Korean Peninsula.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen said after meeting Japan’s 
Defense Agency Director-General Hosei Norota, “another missile test by North Korea would 
create an element of instability and uncertainty in the region.”  U.S. Secretary of State 
Albright, ROK Foreign Minister Hong Soon-Young, and Japanese Foreign Minister Komura 
Masahiko, who met trilaterally on July 27 in Singapore to coordinate their respective policies 
on the DPRK, agreed that this action “would adversely affect peace and stability on the 
Korean Peninsula and beyond.” And they called on North Korea to “choose to build a 
positive relationship with its neighbors by foregoing such testing.”6   This series of 
statements, produced by those who had powerful, privileged access to the public discourse, 
established the perimeters of a reality that was then taken for granted.  North Korea’s 
“dangerous missile” became a fact.   
 
However, other realities were possible--at least conceptually.  First, the North’s 
missiles may have been a bargaining chip, as Leon Sigal suggests:  
 
“If North Korea is determined to develop, deploy and export longer-
range ballistic missiles, as some in Congress believe, it should have 
been testing and perfecting its No Dong, Taepo Dong-I and Taepo 
Dong-II missiles for several years.  Yet the North did not conduct 
any tests from May 23, 1993 until August 31, 1998.  Again, that is a 
strange way to develop new missiles.  It suggests that North Korea is 
restraining itself somewhat in the hopes of conducting a missile deal 
with the United States.  Pyongyang has been expressing interest in 
such a deal since 1992.”7 
 
Alternatively, the missiles may have been a conventional deterrent.  As I showed 
elsewhere, the North’s missiles were so inaccurate that a few hundred of them would have to 
be fired to destroy a meaningful military target such as a command center or an airport 
runway.  Since North Korea had fewer than 100 missiles, it would end up wasting its limited 
arsenal.  The North Koreans might be trying to terrorize the South and the United States to 
gain concessions, as suggested by Sigal and David Wright, but their intention might instead 
be to terrorize their opponents enough to deter an attack. Under the condition of its strategic 
inferiority, the North may be holding the missiles as a weapon of deterrence, much as U.S. 
                                                 
5 "US, Japan and South Korea use carrot and stick on North Korea," Singapore, AFP, July 27, 1999. 
6 The U.S. Department of State, "Trilateral Meeting Joint Press Statement," Washington, USIA Text, July 27, 
1999. 
7 Leon V. Sigal, op. cit., 1999. David Wright also makes a similar argument.  David C. Wright, “Will North 
Korea Negotiate Away Its Missiles?” Union of Concerned Scientists, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/arms/index.html?NKmissiles.exec.html,  April 2, 1998. 
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and Russian missiles serve as deterrents.8  Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that American 
intelligence and military officials acknowledged as much.  According to a briefing by CIA, 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and air force 
high officials in April 1997, the Rodong 1 missile is less suitable as a strategic offensive 
weapon than as a weapon of terror, because of its low accuracy and absence of a guidance 
system.9   
 
 It may turn out that neither of the two alternative realities is accurate.  Nevertheless, 
they are consistent with known attributes of the “missile,” and explain Pyongyang’s motive 
at least as well as the dominant discourse does.  All three could therefore have been given 
more or less equal footing in the public discourse, producing lively, healthy debate.  The 
debate never transpired, however, because only one alternative was given access, a privileged 
one, to the discourse and was thus accepted as the reality.  Entangled in the missile crises 
were both the “politics of naming” and the politics of security. More precisely, the two 
politics of naming and security were caught in a recursive cycle, the outcome of one 
producing the outcome of the other and vice versa: security concerns about the North’s 
projectile produced the reality of the North’s “missile threat,” which then produced such 
security measures as missile defense and the sale of missile-site-buster missiles, which then 
generated Pyongyang’s hostile reaction, which then reinforced the “dangerous North” reality, 
ad infinitum. 
 
In order to maintain the “reality” of North Korea’s projectile as “missile,” as “threat 
to peace,” the production of representation needs highly disciplined, a point well illustrated 
by the events surrounding U.S. Ambassador Bosworth’s remarks in July 1999. In response to 
reporters’ questions on whether the DPRK had a sovereign right to test-launch another 
missile, Ambassador Bosworth was quoted as saying, “North Korea is a sovereign state and 
retains a right to test its missiles. But the North should give up its (missile) sovereignty to 
peacefully coexist with the world community.”10  His comment came in the context of his 
appeal to Pyongyang to stop another missile test: “Firing a missile would have bad effects on 
neighboring countries, which are seriously concerned about North Korea’s possible test. 
Such a test would worsen security environments in the region.” 
 
Despite his efforts at preventing a missile launch, which were consistent with 
Washington’s and Seoul’s official positions, Ambassador Bosworth came under criticism 
merely because of his reference to the North’s “sovereign right” to conduct missile tests.11   
The Korea Herald reported on the following day that ROK diplomatic analysts had said that 
Bosworth’s comment was made at the wrong time and in the wrong place--as the U.S. and 
the ROK were desperately trying to deter the DPRK from engaging in another missile test.  A 
                                                 
8 For a fuller treatment of this line of reasoning, see Sô, Chaejông, "Pukmisailûi palchônyôksawa [History of 
North's Missile Development]," Wolgan Mal August, 1999; and “Pukhan misailkwa migukûi misailpangô 
kyehoek [North Korean Missiles and U.S. Missile Defense Plan],” in Han’gukûi sônt’aek [Korea’s Choice: 
Bush’s MD Plan and Its Targets], edited by Chông Uksik (Seoul, Korea: Samin, 2001), pp. 155-179. 
9 Jane's Defence May 28, 1997. 
10 Jun Kwan-woo, "U.S. Envoy Urges N.K. To Give up 'Sovereign Right' To Test Missiles," The Korea Herald, 
Seoul, July 24, 1999. 
11 Jun Kwan-woo, "U.S. Envoy Under Fire For Remarks on 'Sovereign' N.K's Missile Rights," The Korea 
Herald, Seoul, July 27, 1999. 
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diplomatic analyst at a private research institute said “Bosworth’s remarks could be 
misunderstood by the North” because, “whether intended or not by the ambassador, they are 
identical to the Pyongyang regime’s insistence” [emphasis added].  Another diplomatic 
observer stated, “The U.S. envoy was too naive, acting like an academician.  He, who should 
represent the U.S. government’s official stance here, should have avoided making such a 
straightforward comment” [emphasis added].  The US embassy immediately denied the 
report, saying that Bosworth’s remarks were misinterpreted.  But asked if the ambassador’s 
comment on the DPRK’s missile-test sovereignty represented the U.S. government’s official 
position, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul resorted to obfuscation for fear that a direct answer 
would appear to confirm Pyongyang’s claims.  According to a Korea Herald report, Gerald 
McLouchlin, U.S. Embassy spokesman, stated, “It is not about sovereignty, but about 
whether or not such a (missile) test would be wise.”  McLouchlin said that the ambassador 
was trying to urge the DPRK not to test. 
 
No one has suggested that Bosworth’s comment was factually wrong or misinformed, 
as it would be impossible to refute the fact that there are no international practices, laws or 
norms that deny a state the right to test-fire a rocket/missile.12  Indeed North Korea has the 
sovereign right to test a missile, whether or not this statement is identical to Pyongyang’s 
assertions.  This “reality” of international affairs, however, was not consistent with or 
convenient to another “reality” of a dangerous, renegade North Korea.  If the former were 
recognized as the reality, the latter could not be sustained, at least in this issue area, 
jeopardizing Washington’s and Seoul’s joint efforts to prevent the North’s missile test.  In 
order for the allies to succeed in this task, they had to establish the “fact” that it is a missile 
that Pyongyang is firing into the sky and that this missile firing represents a heretic act, 
posing a threat to the region.  Bosworth’s remarks could not be tolerated in the prevailing 
discourse, and had to be expunged. 
 
Seen in this perspective, the crisis triggered by Ambassador Bosworth’s remarks was 
as much about identity preservation as about missile non-proliferation.  Entangled in this 
little fiasco were both the “politics of signification” and the politics of security.  The allies’ 
understanding of the North’s identity combined with the North’s projectile to constitute the 
social reality of the North’s “missile threat,” which then prompted the allies to react with 
such defensive measures as missile defense and missile-site busters.  The allies’ defensive 
steps, seen from within the North’s understanding of the United States’s identity, constituted 
“offensive maneuvers,” which then triggered Pyongyang’s defensive moves.  In an escalating 
cycle of insecurity in which security measures and identity politics fed into each other, one 
side’s defense fed into its antagonistic identity, which compelled the other to take its own 
defense measures, which reinforced its threatening identity, and so on. 
 
                                                 
12 The Missile Technology Control Regime bans exports of missiles with a range of 300km or higher, but does 
not prohibit test-firing.  Peter Hayes argues that North Korea is "in contravention of an emerging norm" of no 
right of innocent missile passage, but he acknowledges that "there is no controlling legal authority or legal 
framework within which to make such a ruling."  He also concedes that the U.S. as well as other missile states 
have violated this "emerging norm."  Peter Hayes, "DPRK Missile Test: Violation of Japanese Airspace," 
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, September 3, 1998 
(http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/9809/SEP03.html#contents). 
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North Korea as a “Nuclear Threat”13 
 In order to illustrate my argument about social reality of threat, it is useful to begin 
with an observation of a curious disjuncture between “stubborn realities” and social realities.  
On the one hand, there are states that have not only demonstrated their nuclear weapons in 
tests but also proliferated their materials and blueprints.  Some of them are politically and 
religiously as well as geographically close to terrorists, and even harbored, and still do, them.  
One such country, Pakistan, has in recent years provided weapons and monetary assistance to 
the Taliban that had been punished by the U.S.-led coalition forces for having harbored Al 
Qaeda.  It has expressed little interest in dismantling its nuclear weapons programs in 
exchange for monetary and political compensations.  On the other hand, there is a North 
Korea that claims to possess nuclear weapons but has not tested any.  It may or may not be 
able to field ICBMs that could hit the United States.  It is far and away from typical terrorist 
hotspots, and its relationship with terrorist groups is limited and likely a thing of the past.  
Above all it has expressed its willingness to give up its nuclear weapons programs in 
exchange for none other than an improved, normalized relationship with Washington.  Yet it 
is the latter that was being presented as the danger. 
 
The point is not that North Korea poses no danger but that it is a danger to the extent 
that it is socially understood to be so and Pakistan is not a threat to the extent that it is 
socially accepted so.  The disjuncture between the material and the social serves as an 
analytical reminder that the difference in threat perception may not be explained away solely 
in terms of the differences in the material capabilities that the two countries possess.  An 
adequate explanation would have to combine an assessment of the material factors with an 
analysis of the social understandings that American actors have about the North’s roles, 
desires and nature.  The social understandings are no vacuous fiction but rather result from 
socio-historical processes through which Americans come to share a particular image of the 
North on the basis of what they make of representations of the North’s deeds and words.  It is 
to such social understandings that I turn in order to explain the disjuncture between the 
material and the social. 
 
The same kind of recursive cycle between the security politics and identity politics 
that was observed in the missile crisis was repeated in how the United States and North 
Korea were caught in a nuclear crisis. If the “missile” politics showed a discursive tug of war 
between Washington’s and Seoul’s charges and Pyongyang’s denials, however, the nuclear 
crisis was the product of both parties’ charges and admissions that bound them in a 
tightening security dilemma. In launching its nuclear program, Pyongyang may have 
believed that it took what it deemed an evidently defensive measure because it was facing 
who it believed was an undoubtedly aggressive revisionist opponent in the Bush 
administration. But its action was in turn seen as hostile by the United States which held the 
mirror image of the identities: the United States and South Korea as status quo states and 
North Korea as revisionist. In the nuclear politics, furthermore, one side sought to deter the 
other by convincing the other of its willingness, as well as capacity, to inflict unacceptably 
costly damage.  This type of rhetorical tactic and behavior only ended up adding to the view 
that it was truly aggressive and revisionist. Both sides’ words and actions reinforced the 
                                                 
13 For a fuller treatment, see Jae-Jung Suh, op. cit. 
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Hobbesian culture of enmity, within which the United States and the North escalated the 
vicious cycle of insecurity. 
 
There is another important way the nuclear crisis was different from the missile 
politics. Although the nuclear politics was a higher stakes game, its short history—from the 
early 1990s—contained episodes not only of confrontation but also of negotiation. These 
episodes suggest not only that it may be possible for the United States and the North to 
escape from the insecurity dilemma, but also that the “Hobbesian culture” between them can 
complicate and even derail their attempts to escape it.14  In 1991, Bush senior’s decision to 
withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea was reciprocated by Kim Il-Song’s 
signing of the North-South Denuclearization Declaration and the Safeguards Agreement with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This quid pro quo began to deescalate the 
tension and unravel the Hobbesian culture, ultimately contributing to the summit meeting 
between Seoul and Pyongyang and the exchange of highest level officials between 
Pyongyang and Washington in 2000. Despite some ups and downs caused by suspicions 
about the other, the process seemed to be leading to a loosening of the insecurity dilemma by 
the end of 2000. 
 
The end of the global Cold War enmity probably contributed to the loosening of the 
local enmity on the Korean Peninsula, which was further promoted by the regional 
rapprochement early in the 1990s when China and Russia became more favorably disposed 
toward South Korea and Japan. The single most important event that triggered the whole 
train of events, however, was a change in American behavior: namely, the U.S. withdrawal 
of tactical nuclear weapons from Korea. Also critical to the process was that Pyongyang did 
not take advantage of the American action by launching a surprise attack on the South, as in a 
realist’s “worst case scenario,” but reciprocated with its own disarming moves. Washington’s 
quid was returned by Pyongyang’s quo, initiating a virtuous cycle of security enhancement 
that helped the United States and the North to begin to break the vicious cycle of insecurity. 
Quickly taking advantage of the opening, the two Koreas held a series of exchanges – 
reunions of separated families, cultural performances, and sports events – propelling the 
virtuous cycle ultimately to the summit in 2000. In a series of negotiations with Pyongyang, 
Washington too came close to resolving many issues of concern. Clinton’s visit to 
Pyongyang at the end of 2000 was supposed to put an end to the Hobbesian culture of enmity 
and open a new chapter in the history of the two countries. 
 
Subsequent events are history. The virtuous cycle was halted in 2001 when President 
George W. Bush ordered a review of his predecessor’s engagement policy. In his 2002 state 
of the union address, President Bush restored the North’s identity as an “evil” that must be 
removed, thereby effectively ending the virtuous cycle. Bush’s name-calling was angrily 
returned by Pyongyang, which labeled the United States the “empire of the devil.” It is 
important for my purpose to recognize that no obvious changes in material power condition 
triggered such vitriolic exchanges. It was a change in the actors’ social understanding that 
broke the virtuous cycle. The new Bush administration brought to American decision making 
its Manichean understanding of the world where the North, together with Iraq and Iran, 
                                                 
14 On social production of “Hobbesian culture,” see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                   9 
constituted the axis of evil that spreads the danger of terrorists, missiles, and nuclear weapons. 
Not only did the verbal exchanges reflect the new understanding of the actors’ identities but 
they also provided the ideational context within which Washington and Pyongyang took 
actions that restored the vicious cycle. Because the former could not trust the “intransigent 
North” to honor the Geneva Framework Agreement, it halted the shipment of heavy oil; 
because the latter feared an “aggressive Washington,” it restarted its nuclear programs. 
Within the restored Hobbesian culture, the other was always a suspect that compelled one to 
take defensive measures. Within the enmity, such defensive steps were perceived as a 
reneging, an aggression, or a preparation for an attack. Thus the vicious cycle of insecurity 
was restored with vengeance. 
 
The social structure of enmity serves as a perceptual prism that privileges an 
interpretation of facts and uncertainties about the North’s nuclear program as the 
proliferation dangers. It discounts the possibility that the North, as well as the United States, 
is caught in a security dilemma; it amplifies the possibility that the North lies, cheats, and 
deceives. It skews the discursive space in such a way as to dismiss as a deception 
Pyongyang’s offer to negotiate while accepting its rhetoric of war as true. Its denial of a 
weapons program is a lie; its admission a truth. The enmity constitutes the ideational context 
within which realists have it both ways. What is striking about the nuclear crisis is the ease 
with which many of the uncertainties and facts about the North’s nuclear program have been 
assumed away or disregarded. Alternative interpretations have been quickly brushed aside as 
the threat of the “North’s nuclear weapons” has established itself as the reality. 
 
In order to understand the significance of the North Korean nuclear crisis for my 
argument it is imperative to take a step back from commonly accepted assumptions and leave 
open the possibility that known facts could be interpreted differently if alternative 
assumptions were brought to bear upon them.  Instructive in this regard is the U.S. 
intelligence failure about Iraqi WMD programs, as a prescient article notes:  
 
Mr. Powell’s case was largely based on limited, fragmentary and 
mostly circumstantial evidence, with conclusions drawn on the basis 
of the little challenged assumption that Saddam Hussein would never 
dismantle old illicit weapons and would pursue new ones to the 
fullest extent possible…. too little credence [was] given to the 
possibility that satellite photographs and intercepted communications 
might have benign interpretations. [Emphasis added]15 
 
The next necessary step is to acknowledge that although there were facts that lent 
themselves to the interpretation that Pyongyang had been in the process of manufacturing a 
nuclear bomb and although there were many uncertainties about the North’s nuclear program 
that warrant security concerns by the United States, these uncertainties and facts could be 
interpreted in a number of different ways.  One prominent interpretation held that Pyongyang 
had run its nuclear programs for the dual purpose of nuclear energy and weapons but that it 
                                                 
15 Douglas Jehl and David E. Sanger, “Powell's Case, a Year Later: Gaps in Picture of Iraq Arms,” The New 
York Times, February 1, 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/01/international/middleeast/01WEAP.html] 
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dropped its weapons program in 1991.16  Alternatively, as Leon Sigal suggests, the 
uncertainties and facts can be interpreted as representing Pyongyang’s desire to negotiate 
with Washington for political and economic normalization.17  What is striking about the 
nuclear crisis is the ease with which many of the uncertainties and facts about the North’s 
nuclear program were assumed away or disregarded.  Alternative interpretations were 
quickly brushed aside as the threat of the “North’s nuclear weapons” established itself as the 
reality. 
 
Even if Pyongyang might have been successful in developing nuclear weapons, it is 
not a priorily obvious that it poses a national security threat to the United States. After all, 
the British and French possess nuclear weapons and yet do not represent a threat to the U.S. 
because they are seen in a different social context.  Unlike London and Paris, furthermore, 
Pyongyang is likely years away from acquiring a missile that can deliver a nuclear warhead 
to the United States.  Add to it the fact that Pyongyang has expressed its explicit desire to 
improve and normalize its relationship with Washington, as I showed in the beginning of this 
paper.18  Kim Jong-Il sought for a summit meeting with Clinton and proposed to address all 
the concerns that Washington had about its weapons of mass destruction. Yet inconvenient 
facts that do not support the “proliferating North Korea” image tend to be unrecognized, 
ignored, or dismissed.  What is continuously proliferating is the image of the “dangerous 
North,” the end of the Cold War notwithstanding. 
 
There have been many analyses of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.  Virtually 
everyone started their analyses with the assumption that Pyongyang desired nuclear weapons, 
and virtually no one raised a question about Pyongyang’s intention or interests.  Even those 
who dealt with the issues rarely subjected their conclusions to rigorous strategic analysis.  
They merely stated that Pyongyang wanted nuclear weapons because of its strategic 
inferiority, made increasingly worse by its deteriorating economy.  Unquestioned is whether 
nuclear weapons, if North Korea should acquire them, would provide the kind of security or 
offensive capability that the North was portrayed as seeking.19 
 
Andrew Mack and Yi Yông-Hûi, the two intellectuals perhaps most critical of U.S. 
military postures in the Pacific, had the same blind spot when they made an otherwise 
sensible suggestion that any solution to the nuclear crisis had to deal with the North’s 
                                                 
16 Both Selig Harrison and Lee Yông-Hûi suggest that the "doves" in the North's regime won the debate over the 
question of developing a fission bomb in December (November, according to Lee) 1991 when the Korean 
Workers Party Central Committee decided not to pursue a nuclear weapons program.  Selig Harrison, "The 
United States and North Korea: The Nuclear Issue and Beyond," p. 11, an unpublished paper prepared for the 
conference "Korea in Transition: New Challenges and U.S. Policy," sponsored by the University of Bridgeport, 
Bridgeport, CT and the Professors' World Peace Academy, April 16, 1994; and I Yông-Hûi, "Nambuk 
hwahaewa kunch'ukûi sinsidaerûl yôlja [Let’s Open the New Era of South -North Reconciliation and Arms 
Reduction]," Wolgan Mal (Seoul), October 1993, pp. 58-63. 
17 Sigal, op. cit. 
18 For these two points and a critique of the conventional wisdom, see Jae-Jung Suh, "North Korean 'Nuclear 
Threat' and Cold War Hangover: Northern Exposure or Explosion?" Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 28:1 
(1996), pp. 13-26; and Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea, 1988-1995 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
19 See, for example, Michael Ertman, "North Korean Arms Capabilities and Implications: Nuclear, Chemical, 
and Ballistic Missiles," Korea and World Affairs 17:4 (Winter 1993), pp. 605-626. 
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security concerns.  In explaining Pyongyang’s interests in nuclear weapons, Mack offered 
logic that was strikingly similar to Yi’s: Pyongyang wanted nuclear weapons as a deterrent 
because of its strategic inferiority.  Their explanation, however, left unexamined the link 
between hardware and strategy.  A nuclear deterrent is one of many ways of dealing with 
strategic inferiority, and a perceived military weakness does not necessarily lead one to favor 
the nuclear option.20  
 
Sigal also comments: 
 
If, as most people in Washington believed, North Korea had been 
determined to acquire nuclear arms in the early 1990s, it could have 
shut down its nuclear reactor and quickly reprocessed the spent fuel 
to extract plutonium, the explosive ingredient in bombs.  But it did 
not reprocess any spent fuel.  Neither did it shut down its reactor 
until May 1994, long after it was expected to do so.  Even then, it 
allowed international inspectors to verify the procedure.  That was a 
strange way to acquire nuclear arms.  It suggests that, starting in 
1991, North Korea was restraining itself somewhat in the hopes of 
concluding a nuclear deal with the United States.21 
 
The power of the discourse of the North’s “nuclear danger” re-asserted itself in the 
late 1990s when new suspicions began to surface.  Newsweek reported on September 21, 
1998 that U.S. intelligence had detected North Korean facilities where Pyongyang had tested 
“high-explosive lenses” used in nuclear devices.  According to the report, this might be 
further evidence that North Korea was expanding its nuclear weapons program.  In August, 
the New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence had spotted a secret underground 
complex that they believed Pyongyang was building to revive its nuclear weapons program.  
In May 1999 after a long tug of war with Pyongyang, Washington sent a team of experts to 
Kumchangri, the suspected nuclear complex, only to find an empty tunnel and no sign of 
nuclear activity.  However, the damage had already been done: the concept of North Korea as 
a nuclear outlaw had been reinforced once more. 
North Korea as a “Time Bomb” 
In the 1990s, North Korea experienced a series of natural calamities as well as man-
made disasters, which weakened its economic, political and military might significantly.22  In 
the zero-sum competition such as the one between North Korea and the United States, the 
North’s loss of power should have been welcomed because its loss was the U.S.’s gain.  
Washington should have rejoiced for its victory was near.  That, however, was not to be the 
case. 
 
                                                 
20 I Yông-Hûi, op. cit., 1993; Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula," Asian Survey, 33:4 
(April 1993), pp. 339-359; and "A Nuclear North Korea: The Choices Are Narrowing," World Policy Journal 
11 (Summer 1994), pp. 27-35. 
21 Leon V. Sigal, "How to End North Korea's Missile Program," Global Beat Syndicate, 
http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/syndicate/Sigal060299.html, June 2, 1999. 
22 See Chong-Ae Yu’s chapter in this volume for details. 
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The discourse of danger worked an interesting twist on the situation, and managed to 
produce a new post-Cold War danger: North Korea as a “time bomb,” a bomb with a short 
fuse that would implode or explode with serious negative repercussions for the security of 
surrounding countries.  This discourse, particularly prevalent in the mid-1990s when many 
believed the North’s collapse was imminent, suggested two possible futures: that the collapse 
would inevitably cause chaos by unleashing a massive stream of refugees across the DMZ; or 
that Pyongyang would launch a suicidal attack immediately before the collapse.  Many 
analysts discussed when the Northern regime would disintegrate and what security measures 
would best protect the allies’ interests.  It was taken for granted that the North would collapse 
and that its demise would be a security threat one way or another. 
 
This new danger of North Korea as a “time bomb” began to surface in 1992, at a time 
when North Korea was showing signs of a fuel shortage and other economic difficulties that 
would hamper its military operations.  General Robert RisCassi, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. 
Forces in Korea, was one of the first to raise this specter.  He recognized that the North’s 
pilot training sorties and large-scale exercises were significantly limited by shortages of fuel 
and spare parts or equipment and that the North Korean military was emphasizing training at 
the regimental level and lower, rather than at the corps and division level.  But he 
emphasized that “North Korea could wage a ‘short violent war’ against South Korea,” adding 
that the military had not yet tapped its strategic fuel reserves.23  Citing a fact well known 
throughout the 1980s, as if it were a new development, he estimated that 65 percent of the 
equipment needed by North Korean active duty forces had been moved within 100 km of the 
38th parallel.  The military has “forward deployed a capability that is significant,” including 
“enormous amounts of artillery.”  In the event of conflict, Seoul could be quickly attacked, 
and allied command centers hit by waves of North Korean Special Forces.  All in all, despite 
some problems, North Korea represented a potent danger, according to him. 
 
As the North’s economic problems worsened during the 1990s, General RisCassi’s 
view was elaborated upon: North Korea still was a potential bomb but now its future was 
unpredictable--it might be a time bomb with a short fuse.   Toby T. Gati, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Intelligence and Research, represented the threat as follows: 
 
There remains a continuing threat to US and South Korean forces 
from the North Korean military. But domestic economic pressures 
are narrowing the Pyongyang regime’s room for maneuver. We 
remain uncertain about many aspects of the domestic situation in the 
North, but it is clear that the economy is in even more serious trouble 
than last year, including a chronic food shortage. Kim Jong II 
appears to be both actively and effectively in charge, even though he 
has not formally succeeded to his father’s official positions, but new 
and growing internal pressures could change the decision-making 
calculus that has long prevented conflict.24 
 
                                                 
23 Barbara Starr, "Fuel Shortages Limit N Korea," Jane's Defense Weekly October 24, 1992, p. 12. 
24 Statement By Before the Senate Intelligence Committee, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security 
Threats to the Unites States, February 5, 1997. 
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 North Korea’s weakened economy and political instability led many in the U.S. to 
anticipate its disintegration and to worry about the potential destabilization such an event 
could cause throughout the Asia/Pacific region.25  Gen. Garry Luck, commander of the 
USFK, was quoted in the report, “We worry that in a very short period, this country will 
either collapse, or take aggressive actions against the South in a desperate attempt to divert 
attention from its internal situation.”   Lt. General Patrick Hughes, director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), made the point bluntly: the potential for war on the Korean 
peninsula was the agency’s “primary near-term concern.”  He went on to say that “change is 
on the horizon and it’s likely to be a difficult change.”  “We are threatened right now by a 
North Korea which is fragile and I think volatile and trying to determine what direction it 
will go in and whether or not it will be a violent evolution,” he said. 
 
CIA Acting Director George Tenet put North Korea at the top of a list of nations that 
could threaten peace in regions around the world because the “continued deterioration of the 
North Korean economy is weakening the stability of the regime.”  The dangers facing 
Pyongyang included the possibility that food shortages now affecting the general populace 
could spread to front-line military units, that Pyongyang’s security services could become 
reluctant to crack down on dissent, and that the North’s elite could desert its leader Kim 
Jong-Il.  These dangers should worry the North’s leadership, but should be welcomed by the 
power that saw Pyongyang as the evil that must go. 
 
Even the possibility of Pyongyang’s implosion even when the U.S. intelligences 
“have no evidence that any of these conditions are present at this time,” however, was a 
source of concern for Washington. As Tenet acknowledged, “we remain concerned about 
how the regime’s evolution will play out.”26  Within a level mindset, the possibility that the 
main adversary might collapse under its own weight would be welcomed as a scenario of an 
easy victory without shooting a shot; but within Washington’s mindset, even such a scenario 
represented a worrisome development, a threat.  Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, reproduced the twin images of the North as 
conventional danger and as “time bomb” in a congressional hearing: 
 
The need for a combined U.S.-ROK military command and force structure to 
protect our common values is more compelling than ever. Today the United States 
and South Korea confront twin security challenges on the Korean Peninsula -- 
deterrence of armed conflict and preparation for crises short of war.... 
[The North’s conventional forces] threaten the security of the 
Republic of Korea.  Two-thirds of its 1.1 million military personnel 
are positioned within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone, with 
a substantial artillery force capable of striking Seoul with little 
advance notice. In addition, North Korea possesses missile and other 
weapons programs that heighten concern over its intentions....At the 
                                                 
25 Barbara Starr, "North Korea's Collapse Is Threat to Stability," Jane's Defense Weekly June 12, 1996, p. 31. 
26 Statement by Acting Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, February 5, 1997; 
Jim Adams, "U.S. Agencies See India-Pakistan, Korea Dangers," Reuters World Service, Washington, February 
5, 1997. 
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same time, deteriorating economic conditions within North Korea 
and the recent defection of a senior DPRK official raise questions 
about future developments in the North.  Therefore, it is only prudent 
for the U.S. and ROK to consult closely and be prepared for a range 
of contingencies that may occur on the Korean Peninsula.27 
 
North Korea as the “Other” 
 At the beginning of the twenty-first century when North Korea’s conventional 
military threat was increasingly coming into question, the new social realities of “the missile 
threat,” “the nuclear threat,” and “the time bomb” added another layer to the master discourse, 
“the dangerous North.”  Because that master discourse had existed ever since Korea’s 
division in 1945, it made it all the easier to return to the familiar reality. The relative ease of 
restoring the vicious cycle and the relative difficulty of maintaining the virtuous cycle 
provide evidence that the discursive playing field was skewed in favor of the North’s 
dangerous identity.  If the United States’s perception of the North as dangerous had been 
heavily influenced by the global Cold War enmity, since the 1990s the reality of “the 
dangerous North” was reproduced through the articulation of “the missile threat,” “the 
nuclear threat,” and “the time bomb.”  Security practices combined with a constant 
articulation of danger to constitute the social reality of the danger and national security, in 
terms of which the allies made sense of the North and the world. 
 
This is not to suggest that North Korea’s nuclear or missile threats were nothing but 
lies fabricated by intelligence officers. My argument is not that their perception of threat had 
no material basis or that their interpretation of material facts was so out of touch it bordered 
on fantasy. It is undeniable that there were “stubborn realities.” For example, it is a well-
established fact that North Korea had a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility; it is also a 
fact that it fired a projectile into the space in 1998. As the North had been engaged in 
aggression, guerrilla infiltrations, and other brutal acts, Pyongyang’s past behavior warranted 
caution and suspicion. At the same time, however, there were other possible interpretations 
that could explain the same “stubborn realities” as well as the conventional wisdom. The 
alternative interpretations had the advantage of marshaling novel facts that did not fit the 
conventional discourse and that supported the alternatives. If the public space had been a 
“level playing field,” therefore, one would expect at least a debate between different 
discourses. But one observed none. The fact that there were no meaningful public debates 
between different views shows that the playing field was not level. Policy debates, to the 
extent they existed, were carried out only within the discursive space demarcated by the 
official U.S.; and policies that were not predicated on the same understanding of North 
Korean identity were excluded from the debates themselves. It is this skewed nature of the 
discursive playing field--the hegemonic status of North Korea’s identity as “a danger”--that I 
am pointing out. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the North’s identity as the other, as the threat, is not a 
pure fiction, created out of nothing.  As Gramsci noted, in order for a discourse to be 
                                                 
27 Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before 
the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Hearing on US Policy Toward the 
Korean Peninsula, February 26, 1997. 
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accepted as common-sensically valid, it must have some correspondence to “stubborn 
realities” that it purports to describe.  The North Koreans provide “stubborn realities,” – they 
do and say certain things – which are then given meanings and made sense of within 
discourses.  Pyongyang ran nuclear reactors and reprocessing facilities, withdrew from the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, kicked out IAEA inspectors, and declared its possession of 
nuclear weapons.  My point is that reprehensible as these acts may be, they have been 
committed in the context of interaction between Pyongyang and Washington where one’s 
action triggered the other’s reaction and thus where both sides shared the responsibility for 
the ensuing outcome.  And it is due to the nature of the identity framework that the North 
was seen as the sole violator.28 
 
In U.S. security discourse, the identity of North Korea was an unquestioned, accepted 
fact of life that quietly permeated them all without displaying its overbearing presence.   This 
state of affairs provided the condition of possibility for the national security managers to 
continue the old policy of enmity and to institute new policies of confrontation such as 
preemptive strike doctrine adopted by the Bush administration.  
 
3. Institutional Framework of Identity Preservation 
 The preceding sections should not be misunderstood as an argument that the United 
States produces a lie that bears no resemblance to the reality.  My argument is that the 
representations that the United States generates are grounded on what the North has done and 
said and that the representations are part and parcel of the system of meanings within which 
the allied people understand their security environment.  The representations in toto function 
much like an epistemological prism that orient the people to understand a particular set of the 
North’s past behavior and words as a basis for its dangerous identity and that narrows the 
margin of uncertainty about the North’s future behavior and intention in a way that inhibits 
the development of alternative possibilities for the North’s identity.  There is no denying that 
the North itself provides the “raw material” for such representations by engaging in 
aggression, guerilla incursions, and other acts that can be seen dangerous and threatening. 
 
Intersubjective identity, constituted by social practices and backed up by material 
reality, gains a life supporting system if it is institutionalized.29  A socially produced and 
accepted identity does not necessarily find its place in political institutions but if it does, it 
enjoys the advantages that a mere social phenomenon is inscribed in institutions that further 
legitimize the social identity, increase the level of the clarity and specificity of the identity, 
and empowers its reproductivity.  The increase in legitimacy, clarity, and power helps 
lengthen the life expectancy of the social identity beyond what it could achieve without the 
                                                 
28 Leon V.Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press1998). 
29 In this section, I use the term “institutionalization” in a narrow sense to refer to the process by which a 
practice or a norm takes a political institutional form such as a resolution, a law, a government agency, etc.  
This narrow use of the term must be distinguished from a broader definition that sociological institutionalists 
use that includes routinized pattern of behavior that is unproblematically accepted within a society.  James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free 
Press, 1989), John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony," American Journal of Sociology 83, no. 2 (1977). 
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institutional embodiment.  Not only does United States discursively constitute identity but it 
also helps spawn institutions that reinforce the identity. 
 
The Department of Defense, together with its many sub-units such as the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), is one of the key institutional apparatuses that produce a stream 
of representations that stabilize the identity of the enemy and allies.  If it was chiefly 
responsible at one time for the conventional wisdom regarding the North’s conventional 
superiority, it has in the 1990s shifted its representational tactics to the production of 
“nuclear threat,” “missile threat,” and “time bomb,” as I demonstrate in the previous sections.  
Suffice it to note here that their practices of identity constitution are made possible in the first 
place by the institutional arrangement that creates these bodies tasked to worry about where 
dangers may lie and empowered to tell the public who to worry about.  Discourse of danger 
is a likely product of the state’s security apparatuses, which lays a framework of meaning 
within which people make sense of the identity of the states in the world. 
 
Of a number of ways in which intersubjective identity becomes institutionalized, 
resolutions and treaties are a means of inscription that gives the identity an officially 
sanctioned institutional identity.  Immediately following the Korean War, for example, the 
UN Security Council resolutions (S/1501 and S/1511) identified North Korea as the 
“aggressor” in 1950, an identification reinforced by the UN General Assembly resolution 376 
passed soon afterwards, putting to rest uncertainty about who initiated the attack.  Social 
identity, if so embodied in political institutions, gains a staying power that intersubjectivity 
alone could not provide for, which can enable it to outlast the originating circumstances or 
changes in the object of the identity.  The North’s aggressor identity remains institutionalized 
because these resolutions remain effective to date despite the fact that the United Nations 
four decades later accepted North Korea as a member that pledged to honor the UN Charter, 
including the prohibition of the use of force.  Furthermore, the General Assembly resolution 
376, still in force, tasks the UN Command to the objectives of the unification and 
establishment of a democratic government in Korea, providing a legal ground on which the 
UN forces may march north and topple the Northern regime!  The United Nations so 
institutionalized the North identity as the aggressor that it is now confronted with the 
contradiction that it has a member that it is tasked to destroy.30 
 
If international treaties and resolutions serve to stabilize the North’s identity, the 
absence of diplomatic relations between the United States and North Korea functions as a 
primary institutional restraint on the possibility to change its identity.  The absence deprives 
policy makers of the regularized, official channels of communication, leaving only the 
North’s UN Representative Office in New York for a point of official communication.  The 
absence also deprives officials of personal contacts.  Washington further consolidated this 
excommunication by restricting the travel of North Korea’s UN representatives to the 
headquarter district, i.e., a 25-mile radius from Columbus Circle, as per the Foreign Missions 
Act and the UN Headquarters Agreement.  The excommunication and the absence of official 
contact serve to erect institutional barriers to identity transformation. 
 
                                                 
30 Li, Sang-Chôl, "Hanbando chôngjônch'ejewa UNC wisang [Korean Peninsula Armistice System and UNC's 
Status]," Hanbando kunbit'ongje [Korean Peninsula Arms Control] 34, no.  (2003), 275-321. 
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Sanctions, a means of economically isolating a country, represent another institution 
that embodies, reinforces, and extends social identity.  The total embargo invoked against 
North Korea three days after the outbreak of the Korean War to punish it for aggression also 
institutionalizes the North’s identity as the aggressor, and as the embargo remains active 
almost a half century later, so does its identity.  The foreign assets control regulations, the 
Trading with the Enemy Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Trade 
Agreement Extension Act, and Commerce Department’s designation of the North in the most 
restrictive export control country group, Group Z, are all political tools of sanction.31  Not 
only do these punitive measures serve an administrative purpose of severing trade and 
contact with North Korea but at the same time, they also embody an institutional 
arrangement that constantly reminds everybody of a particular identity of the North, that of a 
transgressor.  As such, they are more than laws and regulations; they are part and parcel of 
the American state’s practices that institutionalize North Korea’s identity.  These are more 
powerful institutional tool of identity preservation than academic’s and media’s 
representational practices because state practices are backed by the state’s agencies that have 
the resources and power to reinforce the institutionalized identity of the North.  
Representational practices embedded in state institutions are discourses with purse and teeth. 
 
The identity as the dangerous North is further strengthened by North Korea’s 
designation as a terrorist country.  The institutional matrix of the terrorist identity is 
undergirded by State Department’s annual report, Patterns of Global Terrorism, as well as 
several Congressional resolutions including the Senate Congressional Resolution 99 and the 
House Congressional Resolution that condemned the “bombing by North Korean agents of 
Korean Air Lines Flight 858.”32  North Korea is also on the list of countries supporting 
international terrorism, which reinforces its terrorist identity.  Such an identification is 
accompanied by punitive measures such as loan denial or trade restriction, which may serve a 
political purpose but exacerbates social enmity with the target country.33  Because the 
President is required by institutional arrangement to take an action to remove a country from 
the terrorist list, his inaction perpetuates the identity of the terrorist North.34  Once a terrorist 
identity is institutionalized, it is automatically renewed every year in the absence of an active 
intervention to terminate it.   
                                                 
31 Davis, Zachary S., et. al., Korea: Procedural and Jurisdictional Questions Regarding Possible Normalization 
of Relations with North Korea (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1994). 
32 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: Department 
of State, annual) http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/ [accessed on November 11, 2003]. "North Korea on the 
Terrorism List." Congressional Research Service memorandum, March 5, 2004. 
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/terrorism/CRS-NKTerrorList.pdf [accessed on March 26, 2004]. 
33 For example, U.S. Executive Directors of international financial institutions are directed to vote against any 
loan or other program for a terrorist country.  Also the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by the 
Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989, prohibits transactions with North Korea by the U.S. 
government or any American, transactions that include direct or indirect export of any Munitions Control List 
items as well as re-exports by non-U.S. persons.  Trade Beneficiary Developing country status and Export-
Import Bank guarantees are denied.   
34 There are two ways a country may be removed from the terrorist list: the President certifies that there has 
been “a fundamental change” in the leadership or policies of the government in question; or the President 
submits to Congress a determination that the government has not supported international terrorism during the 
preceding six-month period and has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in 
the future. 
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The dangerous North identity is further fortified with North Korea’s identification as 
a proliferation threat.  Suffice to note here that the making was embedded in institutional 
arrangements and administrative findings.  The Arms Export Control Act and the Export 
Administration Act authorize the President to impose sanctions for a two year-period if a 
foreign person knowingly exports, transfers or otherwise engages in trade “of items that 
contribute to missile proliferation.”  The U.S. imposed such sanctions on North Korea in 
1992 when the North Korean government was found to have engaged in missile technology 
proliferation activities with Iran and Syria.  The findings triggered the imposition of 
sanctions denying export licenses for items on the Munitions List and prohibiting all U.S. 
Government contracts as well as the importation of any products made by North Korean 
entities.  Not only do these institutional measures identify the North as a proliferation threat 
but they also empower state agents to punish it, thereby bolstering the identity. 
 
  Some legislations betray a curious mixture of pan’gong [anti-communism] and 
panbuk [anti-North] as they identify the North as communist and penalize it for being so.  
Section 620(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits aid to any country controlled by the 
international communist movement, and was applied to North Korea in September 1961.  In 
August of the following year, Section 620(f) was added, prohibiting assistance to communist 
countries and identifying them by name, including North Korea.35  Section 8 of the 1986 
Export-Import Bank Act prohibits Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for 
any purchases by Marxist-Leninist countries including North Korea.  Long after the demise 
of the communist bloc and the Soviet Union, such identifiers as “international communist 
movement” and “Marxist-Leninist countries” may have lost the appeal of the Cold War 
period and perhaps even the meaning, the anti-communist institutions live on, reinforcing the 
North’s identity and reproducing enmity with it. 
 
              North Korea is also identified as a “gross violator” of human rights in the State 
Department’s Annual Human Rights Report.  With the passing of the North Korean Human 
Rights Act, such an identity became institutionalized, releasing a host of institutional punitive 
measures, which then serve to stabilize the North’s identification as a human rights violator.  
For example, assistance is prohibited to the government of “any country which engages in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including 
torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment...”  Section 7001 of the 
International Financial Institutions Act requires that the U.S. Executive Directors of 
international financial institutions oppose any loan, extension of financial assistance, or 
technical assistance to any country the government of which engages in a “pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights,” or “provides refuge to individuals 
committing acts of international terrorism by hijacking aircraft.”  The Gramm Amendment, 
Section 42 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act, also requires the Secretary of the Treasury 
to direct the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF “to actively oppose any facility involving 
use of Fund credit by any Communist dictatorship” unless the Treasury certifies to the 
relevant congressional committee that certain economic criteria are met.36 
                                                 
35 Section 620(b) was repealed on December 29, 1981 because of its redundancy with Section 620(f). 
36 The U.S. House and Senate introduced in 2003the DPRK Freedom Bill that listed North Korea’s alleged 
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In 1995, the U.S. took some measures to ease the sanctions, implementing a policy 
initiative announced by the Clinton administration in October 1994 to encourage dialogue 
between North and South Korea and their respective allies, as per the Geneva Agreed 
Framework.  On January 3, an amendment to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations eased 
some travel restrictions by allowing travel agents to apply for a license authorizing actions 
necessary for arranging noncommercial travel for U.S. individuals or groups involved in 
academics, sports, cultural and certain other areas.  On January 10, the State Department 
announced that it had eased the economic sanctions against the North, thus allowing direct 
telephone communication, use of credit cards in the North and establishment of a new agency.  
On February 2, new foreign Assets Control Regulations came into effect allowing the export 
of informational materials to North Korea and all financial transactions directly related to the 
purchase and shipping of the materials.  Finally on April 24, part 785 of the Export 
Administration Regulation was amended to allow the export to North Korea of 
commercially-supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs.  The regulations 
stipulated shipments would be authorized under an individual validated license on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
However modest these steps might have been, they greatly helped defuse heightened 
tensions in 1994 to permit a limited level of communication, exchange and trade between the 
U.S. and North Korea.  These modest changes, together with the Geneva agreement, had the 
potential for diminishing the taken-for-granted reality of the “dangerous” North, and 
represented a step in that direction, a step that subsequently ran into the wall of hegemonic 
discourse.  The most conspicuous example of this collision was the “suspicion” raised by the 
Defense Intelligence Agency in 1998 that the North Koreans were building a secret 
underground nuclear facility in Kûmch’angni.  The suspicion was resolved the next year after 
a U.S. inspection team found nothing but an empty tunnel; still the suspicion, despite having 
been proved false, served to fortify the “dangerous North” identity and helped stall the 
process of political rapprochement that was beginning to have the discursive effect of 
undermining that hegemonic identity. 
 
4. The World According to the North 
             To the West, the North comes across an inimical Other whose very existence is 
anathema to its identity.  To the North, however, the West is the Other.  The North Koreans 
whose Juch’e identity demands “being the master of one’s own destiny” independent of 
outside influences perceive the autonomous and powerful West posing an existential threat 
that constantly seeks to shape their lives.  Not only is the West seen as an existential threat 
but also as an aggressive agent who seeks to force its preferred life-style upon them and, 
failing in this, to strangle it out of existence.  In the face of such a perennial existential threat, 
they have taken what they consider a series of legitimate self-defensive measures, only to 
provide the “stubborn reality” that the West understands is the North Korean danger. 
 
While it is unproblematically accepted in the South and the United States that their 
combined military forces are purely defensive and thus pose no threat, the North is concerned 
about the capabilities as well as the intentions of the countries that surround it.  From the 
                                                                                                                                           
passed at the time of the writing, the introduction of the bill embodies another layer of representations of the 
North as a rogue. 
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North’s Juch’e perspective, the United States represents the “empire of devil” that harbors 
the “ulterior motive” to end its existence and maintains the massive offensive capability to 
realize the motive.  From the perspective of the North that places a premium on self-reliance, 
South Korea, whose military is commanded by a U.S. general, is one of the tools that the 
aggressive Pentagon wields to threaten its existence.  The North whose Juch’e identity grew 
out of its earlier anti-Japanese guerilla campaigns remains vigilant against the danger of 
Japanese remilitarization. 
 
Pyongyang points to aspects of the South’s political institutions as manifesting an 
“ulterior motive” to invade, in the same way that the South sees the aggressive nature in the 
North’s system.  For example, the South’s current constitution claims jurisdiction over the 
entire Korean peninsula, with the implicit but unmistakable implication that what governs the 
North is an illegitimate regime that should be overthrown.  Also it proclaims, while adopting 
the policy of peaceful unification, “liberal democracy” as the principle of unification, a 
formulation which Pyongyang finds not only incompatible with its political system but also 
contravening the principles of reunification that the two Koreas agreed to.37  The South, 
furthermore, continues to hold on to several UN resolutions as the legal justification not only 
for claiming to be the sole legitimate government over all of Korea but also for the use, under 
the UN Command, of military force to occupy the North and to unseat a regime that it deems 
an illegal anti-state entity.38  It also has laws, such as the National Security Law, that define 
the North as an illegal anti-state organization that must be eradicated.  While the foregoing is 
no proof that the South harbors an “ulterior” motive to invade the North, it provides the 
“stubborn realities” that Pyongyang understands to be the evidence of such a motive.   
 
Since the commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) maintains operational 
command over the South’s military, Pyongyang is concerned about not only the South but 
also the United States.  The USFK maintains operational plans that include strikes deep into 
North Korea in the initial phase of a war and maneuverings designed to sap the North’s 
military readiness, some of which border on preemptive strikes.39  The possibility of 
preemptive strikes came dangerously close to becoming a reality in 1994 when President 
Clinton almost chose a military strike option to destroy Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities, only 
to turn away at the last minute.40  The 1994 episode was not unique.  Even before President 
Bush included the North in the “axis of evil” and in the Nuclear Posture Review, and before 
preemptive strikes became part of the official policy of the administration, the United States 
contemplated, threatened, prepared for, and came close to preemptive nuclear attacks against 
                                                 
37 The North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972 lists the three agreed principles of reunification: peace, 
independence, and grand national unity.  Pyongyang argues that the last principle, which dictates that the 
Koreans should unify regardless of political beliefs, is violated by the South’s insistence on one type of political 
system.  The North’s reunification proposal, Koryô Confederacy System, leaves the question of the reunified 
Korea’s political system to be determined by a future generation. 
38 Li, Sang-Chôl, "Hanbando Chôngjônch'ejewa UNC wisang [Korean Peninsula Armistice System and UNC's 
Status]," Hanbando kunbit'ongje [Korean Peninsula Arms Control], vol. 34  (2003), p. 309. 
39 Bruce B. Auster, Kevin Whitelaw, and Thomas Omestad, "Upping the Ante for Kim Jong Il: Pentagon Plan 
5030, a New Blueprint for Facing Down North Korea," U.S. News and World Report, July 21 2003.  See also 
OPLAN 5030 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5030.htm. 
40 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, New, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 
Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 
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North Korea several times since the Korean War.41  For example, in 1998, the U.S. Air Force 
practiced a preemptive nuclear strike against the North42; in 1976, in reaction to the killing of 
two American soldiers, B-52 bombers simulated bombing runs, flying from Guam toward the 
DMZ before veering off at the last moment43; and in 1968 when the North Koreans seized the 
American spy ship Pueblo, “the initial reaction of American decision-makers was to drop a 
nuclear weapon on Pyongyang,” an idea helped by the fact that “all the U.S. F-4 fighter 
planes held on constant alert on Korean airfields were loaded only with nuclear weapons.”44 
 
The foregoing is not to argue that Seoul and Washington are bent on launching an 
attack to destroy the North.  While the Bush administration after September 11 included 
North Korea in a number of nuclear or preemptive strike scenarios, it has sought a 
multilateral solution and continued humanitarian assistance.  Seoul under the Roh 
administration pursued as its top priority the prevention of an open military conflict.45  From 
Pyongyang’s perspective, however, these are the “stubborn realities” that present a serious 
threat to its existence.  
 
Because the North’s Juch’e identity orients it to perceive danger in the outside, it is 
predisposed to take what it considers defensive measures against such danger.  From the 
insecure North Korean perspective, the Korean War was a “victory” that successfully 
defended the Juch’e North against the aggressive American attempt.  The war also served as 
a “stern teacher” that deeply ingrained in the North’s psychic the imperative of self-
defense.46  The North’s Juch’e identity, born of its guerilla struggle against the Imperial 
Japan and hardened by its tenuous relationships with the Soviet Union and China, turned 
during the Korean War particularly virulent against the United States, which replaced Japan 
as the North’s Other by the end of the war.  Pyongyang has since reacted to what it perceived 
was Washington’s inherent hostility by sharply adapting its defensive measures to 
Washington’s moves. 
 
In 1962, the Korean Labor Party adopted “chawi [self-defense]” as a guiding 
principle of its security policy and decided to implement what was commonly known as the 
“4-dae kunsa noson [Four-Fold Military Line]”: to arm the entire population, to turn the 
entire country into a fortress, to elevate every solider into an officer, and to modernize the 
entire military.47  This policy was commonly seen as an effort to turn North Korea into what 
                                                 
41 “Nuclear Posture Review” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,  2002). National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2002). 
42 Hans M. Kristensen, "Preemptive Posturing," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 58, no. 5 (2002). 
43 Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 
1991), pp. 60-62. 
44 Ibid., p. 47. 
45 The previous administrations of Clinton and Kim Young Sam flip-flopped on whether to exercise a military 
option to take out the North’s nuclear program.  See Samsông Lee, Hanbando haekmunjewa migukwoegyo [The 
Nuclear Question and U.S. Policy on the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Han'gilsa, 1994). 
46 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: New Press, 2004), Chapter 1.  See also Jon 
Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War, 1st American ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 
47 The decision was made at the Central Committee meeting on December 12~14, 1962.  For the details of the 
four programs, see the speech Kim Il-Sung gave at Kim Il Sung Military College on October 5, 1963. "Uri 
inmin kundae rul hyongmyong kundaero mandullmyo kukbang eso chawi ui pangch'im ul kwanch'ol haja" [Let 
Us Implement the Policy of Making Our People's Army a Revolutionary Army and Attaining Self-reliance in 
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Lasswell called the “garrison state” that was allocating all its resources to its war efforts. 
According to a South Korean government source, for example, it was adopted to implement 
Kim Il-Sung’s appeal that “we must postpone economic development and hasten to acquire 
the capability to attack the South even without the Soviet Union’s support.”48  Such a 
militarization drive is commonly explained in terms of what Western observers 
unproblematically take as Pyongyang’s ulterior motive: to reunify the nation by force.49 
 
The policy shift in the early 1960s, however, was initiated by a group of “partisan 
generals” who were deeply concerned about what they perceived were the increasing threats 
from “imperialists” and the weakening and fracturing of the socialist bloc.50 A year earlier in 
the South the military coup had just ended a civilian government and a mass-based 
reunification drive.  The authoritarian regime, serious about its anti-Communist stance, 
immediately began a bold dual track initiative to develop its economy and military.  
Particularly alarming to the North that was witnessing Soviet support slipping at the time was 
that the South’s “rich nation, strong army” project was being financed by the Japanese and 
militarily supported by the Americans.51  As the threat from the South was growing, the 
partisan generals observed with increasing concerns Khrushchev “capitulate” in the Cuban 
missile crisis and the Sino-Soviet grow virulent.  The already cool North-Soviet relationship 
took a sharp turn for the worse in 1962 when the Soviets sharply curtailed their supply of 
economic and military assistance, dealing a serious blow to the North military.  After a 
delegation failed in its desperate fence-mending mission later that year, the North Korean 
leadership was confronted with three choices: (1) do nothing; (2) expand military spending to 
match the South; or (3) increase the size of the military without corresponding increase in 
spending.  It chose the labor-intensive policy that would refurbish its defensive capability on 
the cheap—but untenable in the long run: build fortresses throughout the country and create 
citizen soldiers to man them.  This policy choice was also facilitated by Kim Il-Sung’s 
emphasis on the “people’s war” strategy that he developed in his anti-Japanese guerilla 
struggles and honed during the Korean War: stay close to the “mass” and fight a protracted 
guerilla war to drain the enemy’s power enough to force its retreat. 
 
If the Korean Labor Party deliberately chose the 1962 policy to maintain a delicate 
balance between “arms on the one hand and hammer and sickle on the other,” in 1966 it 
made a major policy shift that tipped the balance in favor of the military modernization that 
                                                                                                                                           
National Defense], Kim Il Sung chojak-jip [Collection of Works by Kim Il Sung], 17 (1963.1-1963.12) 
(Pyongyang: Choson Nodong-dang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1982), pp. 432-450. Although North Koreans immediately 
began to concentrate on the development of machine industries to produce conventional weapons, it was not 
until after 1965 when they restored their relationship with the Soviet Union that they were able to import 
modern advanced weapons systems.  
48 Pukhanyôn’guso, Pukhanch’ongram (Seoul: Pukhanyôn’guso, 1983), p. 1439.   
49 Eberstadt, for example, argues that because Pyongyang still seeks “reunification by force,” it allocates too 
much of its resources to the war efforts, bankrupting the economy.  Eberstadt, Nick. 1999. The End of North 
Korea. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press publisher for the American Enterprise Institute. 
50 Dae-Sook Suh argues that Kim Il-Sung didn’t make any report that the above South Korean source charges.  
According to him, “the partisan generals decided to strengthen their military capabilities and fight to maintain, 
and not to beg for, peace.”  Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), p. 213. 
51 In the early 1960s when China was preoccupied with its own domestic problems, it was not in a position to 
provide economic or military assistance to North Korea. 
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required high-tech weapons systems.52  Reflecting the change, the North’s defense spending 
jumped from 19.8% to 31% of the national budget in 1967 and remained at the level until 
1971.53  In this period, Pyongyang imported hundreds of modern weapons systems from the 
Soviet Union such as MIG-21 fighters, SU-7 bombers and T-54 tanks.54  Military officers’ 
influence increased in the decision-making hierarchy, as reflected in the fact that their 
number in the all-powerful Politburo rose from one in 1961 to four in 1966.55  It was no 
coincidence that the North became more active militarily from 1967 to 1971: it increased its 
guerilla infiltration operations, seized the U.S. spy ship, the Pueblo, and shot down an EC 
121 plane. 
 
These massive—and costly to the North’s economy—military projects were triggered 
by what the North Korean officers observed with grave concern in Vietnam.  They were 
alarmed that the United States was escalating its war efforts in Vietnam with few apparent 
restraints.  Witnessing its war expanding in Indochina, the Koreans feared a widening of the 
military agenda by the “American imperialists.”  Their fears were only exacerbated by what 
they perceived was the resurgence of “Japanese militarism” as Japan’s support activities for 
the American war became more pronounced.  Kim Il-Sung was particularly concerned about 
the “trilateral military alliance” that he feared was forming among Washington, Tokyo and 
Seoul against the isolated Pyongyang.56  While Pyongyang was able to purchase expensive 
weapons systems from Moscow, its political relationship was still tenuous.  Furthermore 
Pyongyang and Beijing became critical of, if not hostile to, each other as China was deeply 
embroiled in its cultural revolution. 
 
Beginning in January 1969, however, Kim Il-Sung started openly criticizing high-
ranking military officers for the 1966 policies.57  Those responsible were purged for 
“revisionism,” “military factionalism,” and “adventurism,” and subsequently replaced with 
more moderate bureaucrats.  The bureaucratic shake-up was followed by a moderation in 
weapons imports and adventurous military operations and a frank and public 
acknowledgement in 1970 that the large military expense had pernicious effects on its 
economy.58  Yet it took two more years as well as Nixon’s detente, the withdrawal of the U.S. 
7th Division from the South and the North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972 that Pyongyang 
began to reduce its military budget from 30% to 17% of the national budget.59  In the 
subsequent years, the North’s defense budget decreased from 17% of the 1970s to 14~15% in 
the early 1980s and to 12~14% in the late 1980s.60 
 
                                                 
52 Kim Il-Sung, Kim Il-Sung chôjakchip [Kim Il-Sung’s Works], vol. 20 (1982), pp. 415 & 423. 
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54 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: The International Institute for 
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                                                                                                                                   24 
The surge of military expenditure and activities from 1966 to the early 1970s helped 
entrench the South’s and West’s perception of the North’s aggressive identity.  While 
Pyongyang took and justified these measures as a defensive maneuvering designed to 
complicate and frustrate America’s escalation of its imperialist war against the socialist bloc, 
its “offensive defensive” tactics left an indelible mark on the South and the U.S. that the 
North was an aggressive entity.  By the early 1970s, the North’s aggressive identity became 
deeply institutionalized in the South and the United States, as reflected in the fact that their 
estimates of the North’s defense spending remained around the 30% level regardless of 
Pyongyang’s official announcements.61 
 
Pyongyang began the 1970s with high hopes that Nixon’s détente and the North-
South rapprochement would increase its economic opportunities while decreasing its defense 
burdens.  Its hopes were soon dashed as the oil shocks that hit the world economy left the 
North with unserviceable foreign debts.  Its economic growth noticeably slowed down, 
beginning to fall behind the South’s economy.  While Seoul took advantage of its booming 
economy by developing indigenous defense industry and increasing its import of high-tech 
weapons systems, Pyongyang saw its military spending trailing Seoul’s and the military 
balance tipping dangerously in its disfavor.  It became particularly gravely worried about 
what it perceived to be America’s nuclear war efforts against itself as the U.S. military 
applied its Air-Land Battle doctrine to the Korean theater in the early 1980s.62 
 
To what it perceived was a nuclear war plan against itself, the North’s military 
responded on the cheap.63  Instead of matching American supersonic jets and nuclear 
weapons, it amassed its foot soldiers and concentrated its long-range artilleries near the DMZ.  
The concentration of its forces near the border complicated a nuclear counterforce attack 
because such an attack would run the risk of damaging as many forces in the South as in the 
North.  It was also designed to enable the North Korean forces to “hug” the forces in the 
South lest they should be targeted with nuclear weapons.64  At the same time, the North 
deployed an increasingly large number of long-range artilleries that could put Seoul within 
the range.  Their combined firepower could unleash as much destructive power as a nuclear 
warhead, giving the North a countervalue strike capability.  If the United States had the 
nuclear capability and strategy to “end [the country] as they know it,” the North armed itself 
with the conventional power to inflict a damage that would be acceptable to Washington or 
Seoul.65  A mutual deterrence, sustained on the “balance of terror,” resulted across the DMZ.  
                                                 
61 Ham, T’aek-Yông, “Pukhan’gunbijûnggangûi chongch’igyôngje [Political Economy of North Korea’s 
Military Spending Increase],” in Institute of National Reunification, ed., Kunch’uk mit kunbit’ongjee kwanhan 
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62 Hayes, Peter. 1991. Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington 
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63 Hayes argues that the Airland Battle doctrine was first tested in the 1983 Team Spirit exercise.  Ibid., p. 91. 
The North Korean media routinely criticize the annual Team Spirit Exercise as a nuclear war exercise. 
64 During the Cold War, the Warsaw militaries adopted such a posture, commonly called the hugging tactic, that 
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use nuclear weapons against them. 
65 President Clinton bluntly put the threat during his 1993 visit to South Korea: “if they [North Koreans] ever 
use them [nuclear weapons]…. we would quickly and overwhelmingly retaliate…. It would mean the end of 
their country as they know it.” 
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What the Soviets bankrupted themselves to achieve the North Koreans accomplished with the 
relatively cheaper conventional forces. 
 
While the North’s forward concentration of its forces might have balanced the U.S. 
nuclear forces, it provided the West with yet another piece of evidence that confirmed the 
North’s aggressiveness.  The forward redeployment of massive forces served as a palpable 
proof of its intention to take the South by force.  The evidence leads a study by the Library of 
Congress to unproblematically conclude that the “Korean People’s Army (KPA) is structured 
and deployed on the primacy of the offense” with three objectives: “the destruction of the 
enemy forces, the seizure and control of territory, and the destruction of the enemy’s will to 
fight.”66  Such an understanding was facilitated by the wide understanding of the defensive 
nature of American forces as well as the unquestioned acceptance of the U.S. peaceful 
identity. 
 
The American understanding of the North’s aggressiveness notwithstanding, 
Pyongyang has since the late 1980s been troubled by the indications that its military 
capability fell further and further behind the South’s, undermining its security and even 
threatening its survival.  Its gross domestic product (GDP) stood at 3-5 percent of the South 
Korean GDP in 2000.67  Because of the economic crisis, North Korea’s import of weapons 
systems all but ceased by 1993, while Seoul routinely ranked among the world’s largest 
weapons importers.  In 1991 Seoul spent $7.8 billion on its military, more than three times 
Pyongyang’s $2.0 billion; ten years later, Seoul’s defense budget had grown to $10.0 billion, 
almost eight times as much as Pyongyang’s, which shrank to $1.3 billion.68  While 
Pyongyang was allocating a higher ratio of its national budget to the military, it would not be 
unreasonable to interpret the North’s higher military spending ratio as a desperate effort to 
match its adversary’s spending level -- obviously without success.   
 
That the North was trailing the South in the arms race on the peninsula is vividly 
illustrated by a comparison of the quality of their weapons systems.  While the North’s main 
battle tanks, the T-54/55 and T-62, were introduced in 1949 and 1961, the South upgraded 
most of its 1950s vintage M-48s to M-48A3s or M-48A5s between 1980 and 1990.69  During 
the same period, moreover, the South began producing a new-generation tank, the K-1, that 
carried several state-of-the-art features found in the M1 Abrams.70  It is indicative of the arms 
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race trend that Seoul proceeded in the 1990s to manufacture the K-1 A-1, an upgraded 
version of the K-1, while Pyongyang failed to acquire the T-72 that had initially caused Seoul 
to launch the K-1 project.  Furthermore, it was the South, not the North, that imported the 
latest Russian tank, the T-80U, in the late 1980s.  Not only does the South Korean army 
operate as its mainstay the K1 A1s that are comparable to the most advanced U.S. tank, but it 
also maintains 80 T-80Us. 
 
Particularly terrifying to the weak North was the election of George W. Bush, who 
brought in revolutionary changes in U.S. security policies, all of which had dire implications 
for the North.  Not only did he elevated the North status to one of the primary threats to the 
U.S. but he also adopted the policy of preemptive strike.71  His nuclear policy explicitly lists 
North Korea as one of its intended targets while his counterproliferation policy reportedly 
authorized the use of nuclear weapons against the countries, such as the North, that were 
close to acquiring nuclear capability.72  Media reports of the Pentagon’s war plans only 
fueled the North’s fears.73  The North’s siege mentality was well articulated by Kim Jong-Il: 
 
Because our country is developing socialism under constant military threats 
and siege by imperialism, there could not be the people, the socialist state or the 
party, were it not for the powerful military. In this sense, we can say the military is 
the people, the state, and the party.74 
 
Faced with an overwhelming threat to its existence, Pyongyang could adopt two kinds 
of defensive policies to protect itself: it could try to increase its own capability or seek an 
alliance with other states.  The latter became an impractical, if not unrealistic, option for 
Pyongyang in the 1990s when its traditional allies, China and Russia, raced to embrace South 
Korea as their new friend.  Moscow went to the extreme of letting its mutual defense treaty 
with the North expire and taking more than ten years to replace it with a toothless friendship 
treaty.  While Beijing did not follow Moscow to abandon Pyongyang, it seemed engaged in a 
policy of maintaining equidistance.  Given its dilapidated economy and deteriorating 
technological base, Pyongyang found it difficult, if not impossible, to match the South’s 
power by building up its internal strength.  Its decision to enhance its missile program and to 
develop its “nuclear deterrent capability” grew out of its perceived necessity to 
counterbalance the South’s growing power superiority and the U.S.’s increasing 
aggressiveness. 
 
Pyongyang has since the early 1980s consistently focused on maximizing its missile 
range, and it has relied entirely on SCUD technology to do so.  Both of these decisions have 
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larger political implications. To reach the continental United States with an intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM), Pyongyang would need to develop something completely different 
from the SCUD engine, the only technology it has worked with for the past twenty years.  
There is little evidence that the North has the technological wherewithal to develop an 
ICBM-capable engine.  Without outside help, which is not likely to come, it would be 
extremely difficult, although certainly not entirely impossible, for Pyongyang to develop a 
new class of missile engine powerful enough to propel an ICBM.  Meanwhile, Pyongyang’s 
exclusive focus on increasing missile range at the expense of accuracy -- coupled with its 
sense of insecurity and its inability to match the South’s more sophisticated, more powerful 
weapons systems -- suggests that North Korea’s leaders have sought some kind of capability 
to deter a war.  Such missiles can be used as a weapon of terror with which to convince 
political leaders in the South and in the United States that their preemptive strikes would be 
punished with a massive destruction of civilian assets.  Despite its incredibly inaccurate 
missiles, the North possesses the capacity to wreak havoc on Seoul and Tokyo even with 
conventional warheads, a prospect that Pyongyang hopes will dissuade South Korean and 
American political leaders from launching preemptive strikes.   
 
The United States and South Korea jointly have more than enough military capacity 
to turn all of North Korea into ruins.  Lacking the ability to match them in kind, the North 
seems to have turned to a method that will give it the power to inflict pain and damage that 
can outweigh any potential benefits of a first strike.  It is the logic of Mutual Assured 
Destruction applied to the Korean peninsula, North Korean style.75 
 
Maintaining the “balance of terror” this way, Kim Jong-Il adopted the 
Sôn’gunjôngch’aek [military first policy] that took advantage of the million men in uniform 
as a shock-force to spearhead his economic rehabilitation projects.76  While the West sees the 
policy as yet another evidence of the North’s emphasis on ‘reunification by force,’ 
Pyongyang has effectively deployed the well-organized and committed labor force in 
construction sites, farms, power plants, mines, and factories.77  Lacking energy and capital 
inputs, it turned yet again to a labor-intensive development strategy where the military 
provided the backbone of the needed excess labor while setting the “heroic examples” the 
rest of the population was encouraged to emulate in its respective sectors.78  It is the logic of 
“spin-off”, North Korean style.  While it remains to be seen how successful such a strategy 
will be in achieving Pyongyang’s professed goal of “building Kangsongdaeguk [powerful 
and prosperous nation],” the North itself sees its military as an invaluable tool of deterrence 
and development, notwithstanding U.S. perceptions as a means of aggression. 
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5. Conclusion 
Pyongyang strictly controls the flow of information regarding its national security 
while Washington and Seoul tightly manage whatever information they have about the North.  
The paucity of information provides fertile ground for biases to flourish.  In a frank 
admission of difficulties in understanding the North’s military, Olsen makes a strikingly 
Derridarian poststructuralist remark: 
Guesstimating is the main research tool of the governmental, 
academic, and journalistic watchers of North Korea in the countries 
that feel most threatened by North Korea: South Korea, Japan, and 
the United States....  Compounding the inadequacy of data about 
North Korea is the tendency of foreign analysts to color their 
assessments with personal biases and their national interests.  South 
Koreans and Japanese of various political leanings do this routinely.  
Americans, too, tend to inject U.S. biases about North Korea or 
unthinkingly reflect those derived from South Korean or Japanese 
sources.  The fundamental problem is that the paucity of information 
about North Korea causes Pyongyang watchers to rely on each 
other’s analyses and rumors.  Many analysts turn to two seemingly 
impartial sources of information about North Korea: Britain’s 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and Sweden’s 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).  
Unfortunately, this is no solution because both institutions derive 
most of their data from the same dubious South Korean, Japanese, 
and U.S. sources.  Clearly there is a cycle of misinformation at work 
here which precludes obtaining an accurate picture of North Korea.79 
 
These representational practices produced a particular reality, but that reality is 
further buttressed by institutional arrangements and disciplinary power that the state brought 
to bear upon the politics of signification.  These representations were not only embodied but 
also reinforced by the state’s constitution, various laws and regulations, and state apparatuses 
they engendered.  All of these coalesced to produce, reproduce, and entrench North Korea’s 
identity in a particular way.  As alternative representations were readily dismissed, that 
identity became the true, objective one. 
 
Furthermore, there is a dialectical process by which the identity interacted with 
material reality to result in security dilemma.  The discourses of proliferation threats 
predisposed those actors who operated within them to ignore inconvenient facts about 
Pyongyang’s missiles and to zero in on confirming facts surrounding North Korea’s nuclear 
program, reinforcing their prior conception of the North as a danger. The discourses of 
proliferation threats predisposed the actors to remain disinclined to consider the possibility 
that the North’s actions, dangerous as they were, might be a defensive measure taken in 
response to what it perceived was a threat posed by the United States.  The discourses 
constituted an ideational context within which the United States considered its own actions 
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defensive and the North’s offensive, unwittingly and unknowingly reproducing a security 
dilemma. The discourse framed the North’s projectiles and nuclear programs in a way that 
understood it as a threat; and such an understanding then justified and mandated the allies’ 
taking security measures.  Because the North operated within a frame of reference that 
reversed the identity roles for itself and the United States—a pacific North vs. an aggressive 
United States—it made sense of the allies’ defensive measures as their preparation for 
aggression, an understanding that compelled its own countermeasures.  The two sides made 
sense of the other’s security measure in terms of their understanding of the other’s identity, 
and since the other was—as it had been during the Cold War—understood as the Other, what 
it might have taken as a defensive measure was seen as a threatening move that called for a 
defense.  Discursive politics interacted with security politics to constitute security dilemma.80  
The antagonistic identity distribution has resulted in the precarious “balance of terror” where 
each side maintains a level of destructive power enough to terrorize the other.81 
 
According to Anthony Giddens, a defining characteristic of the modern state is its 
monopoly of the means of violence within the territorial boundary of the state.  This involves 
a two-fold process: on the one hand, the development of the organization of violence by the 
state; and on the other hand, internal pacification.  Internal pacification has been 
characterized by the withdrawal of the use of military power in the internal affairs of the state.  
“What it involves, however, is not the decline of war, but a concentration of military power 
‘pointing outwards’ towards other states in the nation-state system.”82  As Kaldor notes, this 
concurrent process of internal pacification and the externalization of violence is accompanied 
by “a tendency to channel domestic tensions outwards, against some external enemy.  The 
need to establish some common identity as a basis for legitimacy within implies the existence 
of an ‘other’....”83 In a similar manner, alliance practices achieve internal pacification by 
establishing some common identity against external enemies.  And in the absence of actual 
fighting, the alliance, through all its representational practices and institutional arrangements, 
constitutes the identities of the allies and enemies.   
 
The U.S.-Korea alliance has not only participated in the production of social identities 
of the United States, South Korea and North Korea but also hegemonized the enmity between 
them and North Korea.  The hegemonic status of state identities ensured the preclusion of 
debates about the future of the alliance, only allowing a discursive space for consensus on the 
need.  The hegemonic status of the amity made certain that American power be accepted as a 
helping hand whose provision was naturalized within the hegemonic enmity toward North 
Korea.  Within the discursive boundary delimited by the alliance, there was little breathing 
space for alternative discourses or opposition. 
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U.S. perceptions of North Korea are a continuation of the Cold War discourse of 
danger by other representations.84  And it is not difficult to see some of the Cold War 
institutions sustaining themselves on the post-Cold War discourse of danger within which 
North Korea, and other “rogues,” is constituted as threatening enemies.  The Cold War 
alliances, which the United States built over five decades ago as part of its global 
confrontation against the communist bloc, for example, still remains as an active agent that 
works to preserve the “American lake.”  The post-Cold War enmity also provides the social 
milieu within which new programs, such as the current versions of the missile defense and 
military transformation, are born and grow.85 
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